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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ORIGINAL EXPLICATION: A 
DEMOCRATIC MODEL FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF 
MODERN STATE CONSTITUTIONS* 
JORGE M. FARINACCI-FERNÓS†
INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes a model of constitutional interpretation for U.S. 
state courts that takes into account the authoritative adoption history of 
their respective state constitutions, particularly those that were adopted in 
the twentieth century and were the result of a highly democratic, public, 
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation.  
From a methodological perspective, I offer the model of original 
explication.  This method has already been implemented in foreign 
countries like Bolivia,1 and U.S. jurisdictions like Puerto Rico.2  U.S. 
states that adopted constitutions through similar processes should follow 
their lead.  Other countries can also jump in. 
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organized by Barry University School of Law and Texas A&M University School of Law in 
Orlando, Florida on March 1, 2019.  This Article is partially based on several chapters of the 
author’s S.J.D. Dissertation, Original Explication and Post-Liberal Constitutionalism: The 
Role of Intent and History in the Judicial Enforcement of Teleological Constitutions, 
Georgetown University Law Center (2017).  The author would like to thank his research 
assistant, Zoé Negrón Comas, for all her incredible help and contributions. 
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Law School), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), S.J.D. (Georgetown University Law Center).  
Assistant Professor of Law, Interamerican University of Puerto Rico Law School. 
1. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, When Social History Becomes a Constitution: 
The Bolivian Post-Liberal Experiment and the Central Role of History and Intent in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 47 SW. L. REV. 137 (2017). 
2. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Originalism in Puerto Rico: Original 
Explication and its Relation with Clear Text, Broad Purpose and Progressive Policy, 85 REV. 
JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 203 (2016). 
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Like Bolivia and Puerto Rico, many U.S. state courts that are charged 
with implementing their respective modern constitutions are at a 
crossroads.  On the one hand, these constitutions are very different from 
their federal counterpart,3 particularly as to the process of their creation 
and their substantive content.  However, many state courts simply adopt 
the currently available methods of interpretation, which were designed 
with the particular circumstances of the federal Constitution in mind, thus 
ignoring the normative force of their respective adoption histories and the 
substantive content they produced. 
This Article wishes to start a deliberate and conscious conversation 
about how to go about helping state courts adopt a method of 
constitutional interpretation that takes into account both the substantive 
content and, more importantly, the process of creation of their respective 
constitutions.4  I believe original explication is the appropriate model for 
state constitutions created through a highly democratic, public, 
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation. 
Since, as we will see, the reasons for adopting original explication 
stem directly from the normative force generated by the constitutional 
adoption process, I will first analyze the normative case for the adoption 
of original explication and then turn to an in-depth analysis of its actual 
content.  For purposes of clarification, I will offer a brief summary of what 
original explication is at the start, so we can immediately dive into its 
normative justifications, which, in turn, determine the actual content of 
the model itself.  In other words, the why determines the how. 
As such, this Article is divided into the following Parts: (I) this 
Introduction; (II) a brief description of original explication; (III) the 
normative justifications for the adoption of such a model in the context of 
state constitutions that were adopted, mainly in the twentieth century, 
through a highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially 
transcendental process of creation; (IV) the relationship between creation 
process and substantive content, and its impact on the task of judicial 
interpretation and enforcement; (V) an in-depth description of the original 
explication model itself; (VI) how original explication would be applied 
 
3. I do not propose, and in fact would reject, the application of the original explication 
model to the U.S. Constitution.  As we will see, the main normative requirements for the use of 
this model are: (1) a democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
process of creation, and (2) an existing fidelity to the content of the original constitutional 
project.  From my point of view, both elements are completely missing in the federal context.  
As such, original explication should only be applied to state constitutions that have these 
normative elements. 
4. See generally Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts about State Constitutional 
Interpretation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837 (2011). 
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in terms of the judicial enforcement of the type of substantive 
constitutions these processes tend to generate, with an emphasis on its uses 
of text, intent, purpose and, particularly, adoption history; and (VII) some 
of the implications the adoption of this model can have in terms of 
constitutional theory, as to the judicial enforcement of modern 
constitutions.  At the end, I offer some final thoughts. 
I. ORIGINAL EXPLICATION: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
Normally, I would be inclined to start this Article with an in-depth, 
descriptive analysis of the inner workings of the original explication 
model and then turn to its normative justifications.  But in this case, to do 
that would be missing the mark completely.  That is so because the 
original explication model is the direct result of its normative 
underpinnings.  It is not meant to be, though conceptually it could, a stand-
alone model.  On the contrary, it can be argued that its existence is 
premised on a particular historic experience: the nature of the process of 
constitutional adoption.  In other words, the process generates the method. 
As previewed, I will first analyze these normative underpinnings and 
then turn to the descriptive analysis of the model itself.  But, in order to 
avoid any unnecessary suspense or any possible confusion, I offer a brief 
description of the original explication model, so as to give the reader a 
better understanding of the overarching arguments. 
Original explication is a method of interpretation and construction 
that treats official adoption history, particularly the outwardly-uttered 
expressions of the framers of a democratically-elected body during its 
public deliberations, as authoritative both as to the communicative 
meaning of the constitutional text, and as to its normative content.5  The 
term “explication” refers to the different manifestations of the outwardly-
uttered expressions of the framers, including, but not limited to, intent, 
purpose, explanations, possible applications, communicative meaning, 
legal effect, scope, and reach.  As long as they were made publicly during 
the official deliberations of the framing body, all of these utterances will 
carry significant, and mostly authoritative, normative weight.  As such, 
explication treats the words uttered by the framers as the authoritative 
source of constitutional meaning. 
As a result, the main role of interpreters is to interpret those words 
which, in turn, establish the authoritative meaning of the constitutional 
text itself.  In other words, the main source of constitutional meaning is 
 
5. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
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not the text itself, but the explications of its framers during the deliberative 
process.  In terms of sources, this model gives particular weight to the 
public, official, and formal records of the constitutional creation body. 
II. THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION 
MODEL 
Conceptually, original explication is neither inherent nor alien to any 
system.  It can be adopted by different types of constitutions, even though 
they were not the result of a popular or democratic process of creation.  At 
the same time, it can be rejected by constitutions that were the result of a 
transcendental social process.  I argue in this Part that, as a relative matter, 
there is a stronger normative case in favor of the latter adopting an 
original explication model of constitutional interpretation and 
construction, as opposed to the former.  In other words, constitutions that 
are the result of a highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and 
socially transcendental process of constitutional creation have a stronger 
normative case in favor of adopting this model and against rejecting it.  In 
fact, as previewed, one could argue that the existence of this type of 
process of creation is the antecedent event that gives birth to original 
explication in the first place and justifies its use. 
As such, the key to the original explication model is the nature of the 
constitution-making process itself.  As we will see shortly, when the 
process is highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially 
transcendental in nature, the stated purposes, goals, and reasons of the 
framers that generated the text receive special importance, even more than 
the text itself.  In other words, the why behind the text is as important, if 
not more important, than the text that was produced, precisely because of 
the particular nature of its creation process.  In these circumstances, 
process generates and informs substance. 
This requires an analysis of the constitutive parts of the type of 
process to which I refer as they relate to the method of interpretation.  As 
previewed, original explication is the methodological result of 
constitutional creation processes that were democratic, public, 
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental.  I will briefly address 
each one of these elements individually, but only as it pertains to their 
normative role in the interpretive process.6 
 
6. For reasons of space, this Article will assume the existence of such a process and focus 
exclusively on its relation to the actual operation of the original explication model.  I am 
currently working on a normative proposal as to that type of process titled: HOW 
CONSTITUTIONS ARE INTERPRETED DEPENDS ON HOW THEY ARE CREATED: WHEN HISTORY 
REQUIRES THE USE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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First, the public nature of these processes strengthens the case in favor 
of giving substantial weight to the official public deliberations of the 
framing body.  This public characteristic is what gives original explication 
its main normative force.  As such, when democratically-legitimized 
constitutional legislators publicly state their reasons, objectives, 
intentions, and understandings of what the text they are adopting means 
(both semantically and legally), and they do so during the public 
deliberations of the constitution-making body, that exercise becomes 
more important than the eventual make-up of the specific text.  This is so 
because the main normative force of the constitution stems from its 
process and not its actual textual product. 
For example, this phenomenon has a direct impact on the process of 
identifying the semantic or communicative content of the constitutional 
text.  This model can be articulated both in terms of explication as a form 
of public meaning or explication as the best evidence of meaning.  In both 
cases, the relevant intent is the one which is externally expressed during 
the formal process of constitutional creation.  This is so precisely because 
the forum with the most political legitimacy is the public deliberations of 
the constitutional body.  As a result, the People accept that the constitution 
means what the framers publicly told them it meant during the 
deliberations of the constitutional body. 
This leads us directly to the second element of the process—its 
democratic nature.  When the body charged with writing and adopting a 
constitution has a strong democratic mandate, its deliberations become 
part of that democratic process.  As a result, what goes on during those 
deliberations has irresistible normative force.  Moreover, we must not 
forget that the democratic nature of the process is not limited to the 
deliberative body.  It is also applicable to the antecedent stages.  Those 
stages also become part of the authoritative adoption history of the 
constitutional creation process.  The democratic nature of the process 
elevates the framers from mere writers to legitimated representatives of a 
self-constituted People.  As such, when we focus on the framers, we do 
not do it as individuals, but as agents of a broader democratic project. 
The third element is participation.  When the People are highly 
engaged in the constitutional creation process, whether through the 
election of the members of the deliberative body or the constant 
interaction with that body during its deliberations, the People stop being 
passive actors, waiting to see the product of the elected framing body, and 
instead become the main driving engine of the entire project.  As a result, 
focusing on the deliberations of the framing body puts interpreters in the 
same position as the sovereign People.  As such, the deliberations of the 
framing body are not an ordinary parliamentary experience, but an 
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interactive process where People and framers merge.  This adds to the 
normative force of the framing body and its formal deliberations. 
Fourth, we deal with the popular nature of the creation process.  This 
is closely related to the democratic nature of the constitution-making 
process, and it refers to the level of substantive engagement by the People.  
In other words, whether the constitution that is being drafted adequately 
reflects the policy preferences of the public.  When the constitution does 
this, it becomes the People’s constitution.  Again, this leads us to the issue 
of legitimacy and normative force; in this case, as the result of popular 
approval, not so much of the final text, but of the process that created it. 
Finally, I address the socially transcendental character of the process.  
By transcendental, I refer to those historical social processes that 
constitute a turning point or milestone in any given political community 
and that substantially redirect the development of that society.  In these 
instances, the chosen method of interpretation must take into account the 
events of that pivotal social moment, particularly through the use of 
formal adoption history.  This is so because the body that adopts the 
constitutions in these circumstances reflects the transcendental nature of 
the historical process at hand. 
In that sense, the main underlying premise behind the case for the 
adoption of original explication in the case of modern state constitutions 
is their process of creation.  The democratic, popular, participatory, 
socially transcendental, and above all, public nature of the process 
strengthens the case in favor of explication as the crystallization of that 
process in terms of legitimizing force, normative value, and significance. 
This leads us to two final, but crucial, subjects.  The first one has to 
do with the basic normative justification of this model and the overarching 
basis for original explication.  I refer to the legitimacy of the formal 
constitution-making process and its impact on interpretive methodology.  
The second one involves one of the main objections to intent-based 
methods of interpretation.  I refer to how the sheer normative force of that 
process washes away any objections as to the so-called “collective intent 
problem.” 
As to legitimacy, when a constitution-making process possesses the 
above-identified qualities (democratic, public, participatory, popular, and 
socially transcendental), the line between the representative body and the 
People blurs significantly, even to the point of normative irrelevance.  As 
a result, the framing body assumes the role of the self-constituted People.  
As such, its deliberations and expressions have the utmost normative 
force.  This legitimacy makes adoption history authoritative.  When, on 
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the contrary, the process lacks these elements, the normative force of the 
framing body is severely reduced.7 
As previewed, legitimacy leads to authority.  These two elements 
supply the main normative justification for any choice as to interpretive 
methodology.  For example, intent-based methods of interpretation can be 
characterized as inappropriate if the framers of a constitution lack 
legitimacy, and thus, authority.  On the other hand, if the framers do, in 
fact, possess legitimacy and authority, it would be inappropriate to reject 
intent-based methods of interpretation. 
This brings us to the so-called collective intent problem,8 which has 
served as one of the main objections against the use of intent-based 
methods of interpretation.  In essence, the objection is based on the 
physical impossibility of single-group thinking.  When it comes to 
legislative bodies, the objection goes, the only common link is the text that 
is being approved.  The reasons, motivations, purposes, and goals of the 
framers are irrelevant because they can never transcend the individual 
sphere and become collective, unless, of course, they are articulated as 
text. 
But the so-called collective intent problem is really more conceptual 
than physical.  From a normative standpoint, it doesn’t matter if collective 
intent actually exists in the physical world.  On the contrary, it is a legal 
fiction, whose existence and usefulness depends solely on its normative 
force.  When this happens, the only empirical problem is the availability 
of accurate sources.  If accurate, the actual content of those sources is 
accepted as an authoritative reflection of the collective intent of the 
framing body. 
I do not deny the physical problem of collective intent.  But that 
physical problem does not equal normative impossibility.  Collective 
intent, as a legal fiction, can exist if there are enough normative 
justifications for it.  In the case of creation processes that were democratic, 
public, participatory, public, and social transcendental, this legal fiction 
acquires great, and virtually unsurmountable, normative force.  In these 
 
7. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretative Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003); Larry G. Simon, The 
Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985). 
8. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Thomas B. 
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248 (2009); Stephen M. 
Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 295 (2014); John Manning, The Role of the Philadelphia Convention in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1753, 1760 (2012). 
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situations, the political community accepts the legal fiction, thus freeing 
its courts from the philosophical and conceptual quagmire.9  In other 
words, if the People see the creation process as legitimate and 
authoritative, then the framing body, not necessarily its individual 
members, is believed to act as a single entity with a particular intent. 
III. HOW THE PROCESS CREATES SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT 
As we’ve seen, the main normative justification for the original 
explication model is the process of constitutional creation.  From a purely 
conceptual point of view, democratic, public, participatory, popular, and 
socially transcendental processes of creation can generate a wide variety 
of constitutional types with differing content.  But, from a historical 
perspective, this type of process generally, though not inherently, results 
in a particular type of constitution: a teleological constitution.10 
The main characteristic of modern teleological constitutions is the 
substantive nature of their content.  That is, unlike the federal Constitution 
whose main focus is setting up the structure or framework of government, 
teleological constitutions focus on substantive policy issues, such as 
economic organization, social relations, labor rights, and environmental 
protection, among many others.  As a result, the main objective of these 
constitutions is to directly influence the development of a particular 
society through the adoption of enforceable substantive policy preferences 
in the constitutional text. 
As previewed, the normative justification for the original explication 
model lies primarily in the process of constitutional creation.  Yet, because 
the type of creation process that requires original explication also tends to 
generate teleological constitutions, original explication becomes an 
important tool in the adequate enforcement of the substantive content of 
these constitutions as well.  In that sense, original explication is the direct 
result of both the creation process and the substantive content generated 
 
9. See Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking for the Correct Tool for the Job: 
Methodological Models of Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication, 52 REV. JURIDICA 
U. INTER. P.R. 213, 245 (2018). 
In constitutions that are the product of high-energy democratic politics, popular 
mobilization and participation, social and historical transcendent moments, and are 
also public in nature, the concept of collective intent becomes less controversial.  
If the political community accepts, as a political choice, that a certain multi-
member body is authorized and legitimized to act on behalf of the people, their 
intent is conceptually feasible, which is wholly separate from the empirical 
issue . . . . 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
10. See Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Post-Liberal Constitutionalism, 54 TULSA L. REV. 1, 
32–37 (2018). 
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by that process.  As we have seen, in these circumstances, process tends 
to be the overriding factor.  However, we must not forget the substantive 
content that comes out of this process.  Original explication is designed to 
fit with the type of substantive content that generally, though not 
inherently, accompanies constitutions that were adopted through a 
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
process of creation. 
The relation between process and substance is twofold.  First, that the 
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
process of constitutional creation tends to adopt constitutions that contain 
policy preferences in the text that will reflect the views of the social 
majority.  In that sense, these types of processes tend to generate 
constitutions that, instead of being “neutral,” are full of policy-laden 
substantive text.  Historically, this content can be described as “post-
liberal.”  Second, the sheer normative force of the creation process, and 
its status as the main source and cause of substantive content, impacts the 
way we interpret that substantive content in the first place.  In other words, 
because the substantive content of these constitutions reflects a deliberate 
attempt to mold the way society will function and develop, the text itself 
acquires a teleological character.  When this happens, the model of 
interpretation used must give an active role to purpose and intent.  Original 
explication accounts for that role. 
Accordingly, we must analyze the role of substantive content in the 
interpretation and application of these types of teleological constitutions.  
In these instances, because the why is as important as the what in terms of 
the actual text, which is explicitly designed to achieve policy objectives, 
the explication of the words—which tends to allow for further 
explanation, development, and elaboration—can actually facilitate the 
obtainment of those goals.  In other words, teleological constitutions, 
because of their substantive content, need courts to focus on their texts, 
their purposes and the intent of those who adopted them.  It is very 
difficult, not to say impossible, to ignore intent when interpreting and 
applying most, if not all, teleological constitutions.  In that sense, original 
explication links process with substance. 
IV. THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE ORIGINAL EXPLICATION MODEL 
Original explication encompasses two important elements: (1) the 
general social process that originated the constitution-making process, 
and (2) the particular creation process itself.  After taking into account the 
former, original explication then focuses on the official record of the 
constitution-making body.  As stated, this is due to the fact that the social 
process that gave birth to the constitutional project places its legitimacy 
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on the constitution-making body itself.11  As such, interpreters must look 
there to find the ultimate source of constitutional authority and meaning. 
Methodologically, original explication uses the official records of the 
constitution-making body as either the authoritative source of 
constitutional meaning or, at least, the best evidence of it.  As a result, the 
words uttered during the deliberations of the constitutional framers are 
given legal status and are treated as authoritative legal texts.  As such, they 
are the object of interpretation, almost like the constitutional text itself.  In 
particular, interpreters look for utterances that indicate intent, purpose, 
design, goals, elaboration, explanation, application, and clarification as to 
meaning, scope, and effect.  In the end, the framers themselves become 
the primary interpreters of the constitutional text, and courts are tasked 
with (1) interpreting that interpretation, and (2) interpreting the 
constitutional text when the framers have not offered their own 
interpretation, or it is insufficient to solve a particular legal question.12 
Here, the constitutional text is the beginning of the analysis, but it is 
neither the end of the interpretive process nor its most important feature.  
The constitutional text is always subject to the explication of the framers, 
who may address issues ranging from semantic meaning to prospective 
application.  As we will see, most, though not all, constitutions created 
through this process tend to generate substantive text.  And, precisely 
because of the substantive nature of the constitution itself, purpose will be 
a vital tool of interpretation, construction, and adjudication.  In other 
words, highly democratic processes of constitutional creation tend to 
privilege purpose as the main driving force of the text.  As such, this 
requires a model of interpretation that privileges the original purposes of 
the framers as expressed during the deliberations of the framing body. 
As we saw, original explication is inherently linked with a 
transcendental, comprehensive, democratic, and popularly engaged 
process of constitutional creation.  The public nature of its creation is one 
 
11.  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 150. 
12. In that sense, original explication has its own form of the contribution thesis.  
According to its proponents, “[t]he contribution thesis holds that the Constitution’s meaning 
contributes to the content of constitutional law.”  Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Problems and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
253, 263 (2011).  In other words, the communicative content of the constitutional text must 
“contribute” to or guide its legal effect.  In particular, interpreters must make sure that the legal 
effect given to a constitutional provision doesn’t contradict its communicative content.  In the 
context of the model discussed in this Article, the final construction given to the text must also 
never contradict the explication of the framers.  As a result, not only must the normative content 
adopted by future interpreters be consistent with the constitutional text, it must also be consistent 
with the framers’ interpretation of the text. 
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of its main defining features and sources of legitimacy.  Without a visible 
and public process of constitutional creation, original explication loses 
much, although not all, of its normative power.  In that sense, original 
explication is better suited for modern state constitutions that were created 
by socially transcendental and highly democratic constitutional 
processes.13 
The contrast between the process of adoption in the context of some 
state constitutions and the federal Constitution is striking.  While 
Philadelphia was a secret meeting, many modern state conventions were 
highly public and transparent.  Also, the Convention in Philadelphia was 
not elected for the purpose of adopting a new constitution, nor did its 
individual delegates go before the People to acquire a mandate as to 
particular policy positions.  In contrast, many modern state conventions 
were directly elected for the stated purpose of drafting a new constitution 
and after an electoral campaign where the substantive issues as to the 
content of the new constitution was waged.14  While the Convention in 
Philadelphia was a meeting of representatives of the country’s elite and 
wealthy, many modern state conventions reflect the real social 
composition of their population.  While the Philadelphia Convention did 
not articulate a process for outside participation, many modern state 
constitutions allowed for public opinion to directly influence the drafting 
processes, not just their ratification. 
As previewed, original explication focuses on what the constitutional 
framers said and did during the formal deliberations of the constitution-
making process.  This includes references to reasons, intent, purposes, 
goals, scope, and even possible applications of the constitutional text that 
is being adopted.  Also, explication includes explanations related to the 
semantic and legal meaning of words. 
Let’s turn first to the issue of communicative meaning.  For example, 
if a particular word or set of words has a settled linguistic meaning, but 
the framers publicly state that said word or set of words will have a 
somewhat different meaning, the latter trumps the former.  It can also shed 
light on the underlying factual premises that led the framers to adopt a 
particular constitutional provision.  This could help interpreters later on 
 
13. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1028 (1984); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-
Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently 
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 940 (2009). 
14. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to There: 
Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1080 (2005). 
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in order to avoid both anachronistic adjudication and charges of judicial 
usurpation. 
There is an open question, however, as to the extent of explication in 
terms of the meaning of constitutional provisions.  On the one hand, there 
is explication as meaning.  That is, the statements, explanations, and 
elaborations made by the framers during the constitution-making process 
are the meaning of the words of the constitution.  In other words, the 
framers’ intent is not evidence of meaning but the meaning itself.  A lesser 
version of this approach is that the original explication of the framers is 
the best evidence of meaning.  As a result, there is some theoretical space 
between the explication and the actual meaning of the words.  This would 
allow the use of additional evidences of meaning when carrying out both 
communicative interpretation and legal construction.  Yet, as a practical 
matter, the authoritative nature of the explication, and the empirical 
richness that normally accompanies it, limits the gap to the point of virtual 
irrelevance.  In the end, both alternatives are consistent with the original 
explication model. 
As to the substantive and normative content of the text, original 
explication also has an important role to play.  For example, the issues of 
intent and purpose have several manifestations and implications.  First, 
the issue of the reasons or purposes that drove the framers to adopt a 
particular word or set of words—or why they did what they did.  Second, 
the objectives or goals that motivated the framers—or what they were 
trying to achieve.  Third, the understandings of the framers—or their 
linguistic and legal assumptions that impact the meaning of the adopted 
text.  And finally, the purposes and goals of the constitutional project 
itself—or in addition to the goals the framers publicly expressed they were 
trying to achieve, what is the goal of the Constitution as adopted and 
contextualized by original explication. 
Therefore, if a constitution’s content is full of substantive policy 
preferences that were adopted as the direct product of a result-oriented 
process, then the intent, purpose, and goals of the framers must be taken 
into account, precisely because it is there that we will find the source and 
content of that substance.  If the text of a constitution can be characterized 
as inherently or substantively teleological in nature, then we must 
privilege the sources that will yield that content.  And in the context of the 
particular process of creation that has been discussed so far, only original 
explication can adequately deal with process and substance at the same 
time. 
Finally, an obvious question comes to mind when analyzing the 
concept of original explication: how is it different from the other intent-
based methodologies currently used in the United States, particularly 
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original intent, original public meaning, and the subjective teleological 
model?  Original explication is partially a combination of these 
approaches and also a separate and distinct model of interpretation.  I now 
turn to a contrast between original explication and its other intent-based 
counterparts of constitutional interpretation, so we can better appreciate 
its form and understand its differences with these alternatives.15 
A. Original Intent 
Original intent focuses on what the framers attempted or wanted to 
do when they enacted the constitutional text.16  In other words, it tries to 
identify what they were trying to communicate through the text.  This 
refers to both communicative and normative content.  This would also 
include, for example, the original expected applications of the framers.  
This means that when interpreting or applying a particular constitutional 
provision, we should analyze how the authors would interpret it or apply 
it.  
In its weakest form, original intent only treats the authors’ views as 
to the communicative meaning and legal effect of their words as 
authoritative.  Since the text is merely the articulation of the authors’ 
thoughts, it is imperative to know what the authors thought the text they 
adopted meant.  In its strongest form, original intent treats the authors’ 
views as to how the text should be applied in a particular case or 
controversy as authoritative as well.  This responds to the view that a legal 
text should only be applied consistently with its authors’ views.  Needless 
to say, this latter articulation of the original intent model can be very 
speculative, particularly with controversies that were never analyzed or 
contemplated by the framers. 
The main difference between original explication and the model of 
original intent is the way in which intent is articulated.  Intent can be 
inward, private, and unknown to others; explication is always external, 
public, and shared.  Also, intent can be informal and unofficial, while 
explication is always formal and official. 
This, for example, has a direct effect on the issue of sources.  While 
some versions of original intent allow for private conversations, 
 
15. For a more in-depth analysis of these models and how they contrast with each other, 
see Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9. 
16. See generally Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some 
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Richard S. Kay, The Adherence to the Original 
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
226 (1988); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. 
COMMENT. 77 (1988); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
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correspondence, and other writings to be used to ascertain an individual’s 
intent, as well as publicly expressed intent made outside the formal 
constitutional-creation process, explication is limited to the publicly made 
statements and actions of the constitutional legislator while acting in that 
capacity.  This is so because political authority and legitimacy is given by 
the process, not by the individual.  As such, only the publicly made 
statements made during deliberations are authoritative.  Other statements, 
whether private or made publicly but outside the constitutional 
deliberations, are given only persuasive, contextual, or secondary weight. 
Furthermore, intent has the problem of abstraction and a level of 
generality.  This is so because it is sometimes up to the interpreter to 
ascertain that intent, especially when it was not articulated by the framers.  
In that sense, ascertaining intent becomes an exercise in reverse 
engineering or deduction.  In the original explication model, the formality 
of the statements made by the framers allows interpreters to address them 
as they would any other legal text.  After all, the explications of the 
framers are laid out in formal and official documents—mostly transcripts 
of the deliberations of the constitution-making body; in other words, they 
become text and, thus, are subject to interpretation. 
Yet, because of the nature and structure of that text, the problem of 
under-determinacy17 is less as compared to the formal constitutional text.  
This is due to the fact that constitution makers tend to be terser in terms 
of the selection of words for the formal constitutional text in order to make 
it practical and accessible, while they have a much freer hand in 
elaborating during the deliberations of the constitutional body.  An 
example of this is Puerto Rico, where the Constitution is relatively short, 
but is accompanied by more than 2,500 pages of explication.  In other 
words, short constitutional provisions tend to generate more under-
determinacy than longer and detail-rich explications.  Under-determinacy 
is still present, but considerably reduced. 
B. Original Public Meaning 
Original public meaning focuses on what the general public thought 
the constitutional text meant at the time of its adoption.18  While there 
 
17. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).  Under-determinacy occurs when the communicative content of 
the text does not provide sufficient normative content to solve a particular legal issue. 
18. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 
CONST. COMMENT. 71 (2016); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive 
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 15 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); James E. 
Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433 (2013); Richard 
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seems to be some doubt about whether this is limited to communicative 
meaning, or if it also extends to legal or normative meaning,19 there is 
agreement that the only binding source is the text itself.  And because the 
text needs to be accepted by the public in order to become the constitution, 
the authoritative source of constitutional meaning is the understanding of 
the general public at the time. 
In this model, the authors’ role is limited to enacting the text.  As a 
result, “the authors lack either legitimacy or authority as to the meaning 
and effects of the text they adopted beyond the act of adoption itself.”20  It 
would appear that original public meaning privileges two important 
elements: authority and publicity.  The main problem with original public 
meaning is that most, if not all, of its normative claims are specifically and 
exclusively designed for the U.S. Constitution, which was written in secret 
(as opposed to publicly) and in which the Framers did not have the power 
to adopt the text, only to suggest it to the ratifying public (thus lacking 
authority). 
Original public meaning is definitely not suited for the type of 
constitution-making process analyzed in this Article.  As I have argued, in 
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
processes of creation, the line between framers and the general public 
blurs significantly.  As a result, there is no real distinction between the 
authors’ intent and public meaning.  
Original intent and original public meaning have many differences 
and similarities.  In terms of original explication, these differences and 
similarities are almost irrelevant.  This is because original explication 
encompasses both intent and public meaning. 
In the original explication model, because of the public nature of the 
constitution-making process, the explication becomes the public meaning 
of the words.  In other words, by exteriorizing and publicizing their 
explication, the public is aware that the meaning of a particular word or 
set of words, as used in the constitution, is what the framers explained it 
to mean.  For example, if the framers publicly state their understanding of 
what “cruel” or “imminent” or “reasonable” means, the public meaning of 
 
S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 703 (2009); James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & 
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 
21 (2016). 
19. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 
569, 586–91 (1998). 
20. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9, at 250 (emphasis in original). 
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those words in the constitutional context is the meaning given by the 
framers. 
Another important difference between the original explication model 
and original public meaning originalism is the effect it has on the 
interpretation-construction distinction.  Originalists in the United States 
have a theory of interpretation, not construction.21  As such, originalism 
primarily focuses on the analysis of the communicative content of the 
constitutional text, leaving as a separate issue the matter of giving legal 
effect to that content, particularly in situations where the communicative 
content is under-determinate as to constitutional doctrine. 
In the case of original explication, while there is room to distinguish 
between interpretation and construction, explication affects both.  This is 
because explication privileges both the communicative meaning the 
framers gave to the words they were adopting, as well as the legal effects 
they wanted them to have.  As such, original explication is both a theory 
of interpretation and of construction.  In that case, the legal effect the 
framers gave to a particular provision can actually contradict the semantic 
meaning of the words.  This would negate the contribution thesis in a 
certain way, although this too can be reconciled by stating that the 
semantic meaning of the words is what the framers explicated.  Thus, 
when an apparent contradiction emerges between semantic meaning and 
the framers’ statements as to its legal effects, we can either say that 
explication trumps semantic meaning, or that it alters it, thus eliminating 
the contradiction.  In other words, the framers’ explication as to legal 
effect also impacts the semantic meaning in the first place. 
C. Subjective Teleological Model 
The subjective teleological model is very similar to the original intent 
approach.  It is also similar to original explication.  It seems to serve as a 
bridge between both of them.  The subjective teleological approach turns 
to the framers instead of just the text—thus subjective instead of 
objective—and it focuses on the purposes that animated or motivated the 
framers—thus teleological.22 
 
21. “It is important to keep in mind that originalism is warranted as a theory of 
interpretation—that is, as a method for determining the meaning of the words written in the 
Constitution.”  Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 101, 108 (2001); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2015). 
22. See András Jakab, Judicial Reasoning in Constitutional Courts: An European 
Perspective, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1215 (2013); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From 
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
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But unlike original intent or original explication, the subjective 
teleological model limits its inquiry to purpose, potentially leaving out 
other issues related to intent, such as semantic meaning, scope, and 
application.  Therefore, it seems that the subjective teleological model is 
a narrower version of the original intent approach. 
But in the specific case of teleological constitution, the gap between 
original explication and the subjective teleological model narrows 
considerably because, since purpose is the driving force behind the 
constitutional project, purpose will play a prominent role in the 
explication given by the framers.  While original explication does not limit 
itself to purpose, the latter is front and center in teleological systems 
because of the substantive nature of the constitutional text and structure.  
Since the framers drafted a teleological constitution with stated policy 
goals, the subjective intent of the framers in terms of purpose, as 
articulated in their explications, becomes the main ingredient of 
constitutional interpretation and construction. 
But the case for original explication seems stronger in teleological 
constitutions than the one in favor of the subjective teleological model, 
precisely because the former is considerably more comprehensive as to 
the tools it provides and the constraint it creates.  This is particularly true 
in situations where those teleological constitutions were the product of 
highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and socially 
transcendental processes of creation.  In these situations, there are two 
elements that should be taken into account.  First, the normative force 
generated by the creation process.  Second, the teleological nature of the 
constitution.  As such, both must be taken into account, and the subjective 
teleological model focuses too much on the latter and too little on the 
former.  The original explication model accounts for both, privileging the 
purposes stated in the explications, but also focusing on other intent-
related statements and elaborations. 
D. Original Methods 
This model states that “the constitutional text should be interpreted 
using the tools the framers themselves used in the process of constitutional 
interpretation, and thus . . . believe would be used by later interpreters.”23  
As such, this model does not have inherent normative or substantive 
content, since it will vary depending on the particular constitution and the 
 
23. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 9, at 261.  See also John O. McGinnis & Michael 
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
371 (2008); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods of Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 
(2009). 
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views of its framers as to the prevailing methods of interpretation.  This 
model proposes that the correct method of interpretation is the one the 
framers thought would be used.  The reasoning behind this model is that 
an author will take into account what he or she believes will be done by 
interpreters.  That belief necessarily requires identifying the prevailing 
methods of interpretation at the time the framers adopted the constitution. 
The main difference between this model and original explication is 
normative.  The correct method of interpretation does not respond to the 
authors’ views about hermeneutics, but to the normative force generated 
by the constitution-making process itself.  In other words, it is the process, 
not the views of the framers as to interpretation, which will command the 
appropriate interpretive methodology.  Of course, it may be that said 
process will take us back to the framers’ wishes as to hermeneutics, but it 
is the result of a different normative path.  The original methods model 
treats the framers’ views on interpretation as authoritative as a starting 
point.  Original explication starts with the process, and depending on the 
normative force it generates, then may turn to the framers, not because the 
framers wanted it so, but because the process of creation requires that 
approach. 
V. ORIGINAL EXPLICATION AND MODERN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
As we just saw, there are two key elements that relate to our current 
analysis.  First, the content of the constitution—modern teleological state 
constitutions, which tend to include a whole array of policy-laden 
provisions, particularly in the realm of individual and collective rights, as 
well as to matters related to economic organization, social structure, 
environmental protection, labor relations, and cultural diversity.24  
Second, the process that created the constitution itself—highly 
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
processes that, as a result, gave tremendous authority and legitimacy to 
the persons and bodies charged with constitutional drafting. 
While not inherent to them, post-liberal teleological constitutions 
tend to be, as a historical matter, the result of these types of social 
processes, from social reform movements in Puerto Rico, mobilized 
indigenous majorities in Bolivia, or a transition from apartheid in South 
Africa.  The same can be said about successful democratic and civic 
movements in various U.S. states during the twentieth century.  The 
content of these constitutions is highly teleological and post-liberal, and 
 
24. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking Beyond the Negative-Positive 
Rights Distinction: Analyzing Constitutional Rights According to their Nature, Effect and 
Reach, 41 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31 (2018). 
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the process of their creation can be characterized as transcendental, 
historical, and social moments in the life of the political community. 
As a result, original explication interacts with modern teleological 
constitutions in two ways.  First, it fits neatly with the process of creation 
by adequately taking into account the will of the constitution-creating 
body when it comes to interpreting and implementing the constitutional 
content.  It seems that some sort of originalist approach may be required 
when the constitution was the result of a highly democratic and 
transcendental constitution-making process.  Taking the framers out of the 
picture would seem awkward and even illegitimate.  Second, original 
explication allows for the maximum use of the teleological nature of these 
types of constitutions by adequately taking into account intent, purpose, 
and history—elements which are inherently linked to the substantive 
content of teleological constitutions. 
Unlike the other originalist approaches, original explication 
appropriately combines both the issues of process and substance, while 
maintaining a normative base of justification that allows for future events 
to require its abandonment.  In other words, original explication is the only 
model that adequately acknowledges the importance of the constitution-
making body as the source of constitutional meaning (process) and the 
importance of the actual content of the text itself (substance).  It is also 
designed to take into account future procedural and substantive 
developments that could require a course correction as to methodology. 
Too much focus on intent outside the constitution-making process—
for example, focusing on private correspondence over official statements 
made during the constitutional assembly—would negate the importance 
of the process of creation itself as the main legitimizing factor of the 
constitutional project.  As such, original explication works better than 
original intent by focusing on the formal and official statements made 
during creation, as well as its accompanying historical context.  The same 
would be true as it relates to the subjective teleological model, which 
would seem too narrow and insufficient. 
Precisely because the type of creation process discussed in this 
Article tends to generate constitutions that are full of substantive content, 
greater emphasis should be given to non-textual sources.  In other words, 
since the text itself and the structure of the constitution are teleological in 
nature, thus an explicit part of the constitutional project, the text becomes 
part of the why.  Original explication unites process and substance, taking 
into account that in these circumstances, process creates substance and 
substance is a reflection of process.  In both instances, the process of 
adoption becomes one of the central aspects, if not the central aspect, of 
the constitutional project itself. 
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As a historical matter, modern teleological constitutions tend to be of 
a progressive bent.  As such, the use of an original explication approach 
tends to produce broad and progressive results.  In other words, the 
explication can—although not always—generate a self-updating text, 
because the framers themselves precisely explained their broad and 
progressive intent.  In some instances, this could even empower courts to 
go beyond the specific intent of the framers, as they have manifested their 
wish that the broadest interpretation and construction be given to their 
words, in case they fail to take into account future developments.  When 
true, this would totally obliterate the originalism-as-narrow and living-
constitutionalist-as-broad dichotomy, because the original explication of 
the framers can either require a living constitutionalist approach or be 
such that it produces the broad approach to constitutional adjudication.  
Additionally, original explication may reveal the underlying factual 
premises that guided the framers.  Thus, courts are better equipped to deal 
with the issue of changing circumstances, while maintaining fidelity with 
the original constitutional project and the will of its framers.  
VI. ORIGINAL EXPLICATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Original explication can constitute a breakthrough in modern 
constitutional theory because it is an interpretive method that combines 
the transcendental process component of teleological constitutions with 
its substantive content.  As such, it can eliminate much of the under-
enforcement problems that some of these systems, particularly U.S. states, 
have faced because some courts still cling to interpretive models that fail 
to take into account these two elements. 
Of course, interpretive methods are only one side of the coin.  The 
other side is the need for courts to accept the new roles assigned to them 
by constitution makers in teleological systems, which includes judicial 
intervention into policy areas.  Teleological state constitutions represent a 
direct challenge to classic concepts of the judicial role in general and how 
courts apply constitutional provisions in particular.  Modern teleological 
constitutions have considerably broadened the catalogue of issues, 
arguments, types of controversies, and choices of remedies facing courts.  
As such, current models of judicial enforcement of constitutional 
provisions are ill-suited for the application of substantive policy 
provisions.  New methods are needed.25 
 
25. See generally Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1044; Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, 
Constitutionally Required Judicial Activism: Re-Examining the Role of Courts in Modern 
Constitutional Adjudication, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36 (2018). 
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For example, the court-as-primarily-a-negative-legislator view has 
been both transformed and destroyed: (1) transformed because the content 
of the substantive protections, even in negative rights cases, will often 
require courts to intervene in a whole host of public policy issues where 
the constitution has taken a position, from labor rights to economic 
organization; and (2) destroyed because they have added a wide array of 
issues which transcend the mere implementation of negative rights and 
provisions, ranging from positive rights against private parties to deeper 
intervention in policy matters where they must implement the framers’ 
designs over the wishes of current ordinary politics.  The list seems 
endless: positive horizontal rights articulated as rules, negative vertical 
rights articulated as principles, specific policy provisions, and so on. 
Modern state constitutions that are teleological in nature offer a 
challenge to state courts, and original explication constitutes an 
interpretive alternative that can adequately take into account both the 
process of creation and the substantive content of these constitutions, thus 
allowing courts to enforce these constitutions as they were designed to be, 
thus strengthening democratic self-governance through judicial action and 
intervention.  Quite the revolution indeed.  As we’ve seen in these cases, 
original explication is both a normative obligation and a helpful tool. 
Many modern state constitutions are under enforced, particularly 
when it comes to their substantive policy provisions.26  One of the reasons 
for this problem is that many state court judges take too many 
methodological pages from the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
interprets the federal Constitution.  As such, state courts fall into several 
traps. 
First, the reasons for using or discarding a particular model of 
interpretation will differ when analyzing a modern state constitution, as 
opposed to the older federal text.  This creates the risk of discarding 
adoption history-based models of interpretation for reasons that are only, 
or at least mainly, applicable to the U.S. Constitution.  The normative and 
empirical justifications for using those models in the state context remain 
present despite their lack of applicability in the federal context.  
Second, the effects of using a particular intent or adoption history-
based model of interpretation are considerably different in the state 
context.  For example, state constitutions, as compared to their federal 
counterpart, tend to include substantive policy matters.  When this is 
combined with intent or adoption history-based models of interpretation, 
the end results would be different from what normally occurs in federal 
 
26. See Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 871 
(2008). 
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courts.  As such, courts should take a closer and deeper look into how 
these interpretive models would aid in the development of state 
constitutional law. 
Third, the current models of interpretation used, or discussed, in the 
United States are premised on the structure, framework, and content of 
the federal Constitution.  Yet many modern state constitutions have a 
whole array of provisions that simply have no remotely similar 
counterpart in the federal text.  Therefore, there is a normative and 
methodological gap that risks deepening state constitutional under-
enforcement. 
Also, the arsenal of tools available to state courts in modern 
teleological systems is varied.  The first tool is the use of reasonableness 
tests in order to ascertain the government’s—or a private party’s—duty in 
the context of the enforcement of positive rights.  Second is the 
comprehensive use of the negative legislator role in situations where there 
are policy rules which control legislative and executive discretion.  Third 
is the effective use of the injunctive and mandamus powers.  Fourth is the 
expansion of rights protection as required by the specific rule-broad 
language combination.  Fifth is the development of new remedial 
measures and writs that adequately take into account the substantive 
content of teleological constitutions.  The use of these tools is particularly 
adequate if the original explication actually supports it. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern teleological state constitutions that are the result of 
transcendental social processes pose a challenge in terms of interpretive 
methodologies and models of construction and adjudication.  Current 
models are insufficient to guarantee their adequate enforcement, 
particularly in terms of putting into effect their substantive policy content. 
Furthermore, because of the ideological connotations of these types 
of constitutions, the issue of continued allegiance, fidelity, and connection 
between the current political community and the original constitutional 
project is crucial.  As such, when the original project still holds, some sort 
of intent or adoption history-based approach is warranted.  More 
importantly, when the process of constitutional creation constitutes a vital 
aspect of the political community, the role of the framers is augmented.  
Hence, original explication, which takes into account both the teleological 
content of these constitutions and their highly dynamic and democratic 
process of creation. 
Original explication is a starting point, not an endgame.  Its own 
normative basis requires a constant analysis of the level of legitimacy, 
authority, and fidelity enjoyed by the constitutional project.  This includes 
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measuring these factors over time, for a process that once enjoyed them 
may lose them in the future.  Original explication only works when the 
original process still commands legitimacy and authority.  Continued 
fidelity to the process and its substantive product will be needed for the 
model to endure.  If, in fact, the original process, because of its 
democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental 
character, still commands legitimacy and authority, I believe that original 
explication is the required method of constitutional interpretation, 
construction, and adjudication, at least until another similar process comes 
along.  In the end, time will tell if what we said then is what we want now. 
 
